Abstract-A designated verifier signature (DVS) scheme has the property that only the designated verifier specified by the signer can check the validity of the signature instead of anyone else. Meanwhile, the designated verifier can not use this proof to convince any third party that a signature is generated by the claimed signer. Consider the application of three-party communication environment. One party may has to generate a signature such that only the other two is capable of verifying it solely. In this paper, we propose a novel DVS scheme for three-party communication environment from pairings. The proposed scheme has the following advantages: (i) Each of the two designated verifiers can independently check the validity of the signature without cooperating with the other; (ii) The proposed scheme is efficient in terms of the executed pairings, since it only needs one pairing computation to generate a DVS for two designated verifiers; (iii) The proposed scheme satisfies the security requirements of unforgeability, non-transferability and source hiding.
I. INTRODUCTION
Since Diffie and Hellman [2] proposed the first public key system based on the discrete logarithm problem in 1976, public key systems [4, 10, 13] have been extensively studied. A digital signature scheme [3, 10] is one fundamental cryptographic technique which primarily aims for providing authenticity [14] and non-repudiation [8] . Traditionally, a digital signature can be verified by anyone else with the signer's public key. Yet, in some special applications such as the electronic voting [9, 12] and the electronic auction [6, 17] , the signatures are not suitable for the public verification. To fulfill such requirement, Jakobsson et al. [5] introduced the concept of designated verifier proofs and in a sense proposed a designated verifier signature (DVS) scheme in 1996. Although the resulted signature is publicly verifiable in their scheme, only the designated verifier can be convinced that a signature is generated by the claimed signer. On the other hand, the designated verifier can also create a valid signature which is computationally indistinguishable from the one issued by the original signer for any third party. Consequently, the designated verifier can not use this proof to convince any third party that a signature is created by the claimed signer. In 2003, however, Wang [16] pointed out that their scheme is insure for that a malicious signer can easily cheat the designated verifier.
In 2004, Saeednia et al. [11] proposed a strong designated verifier signature scheme in which the signature verification requires the assistance of the designated verifier's private key to compete. Therefore, only the designated verifier has the ability to verify the signature. Generally speaking, a DVS scheme should satisfy the following security requirements:
1) Unforgeability:
Given the identifier of some designated verifier, say, U 1 , it is computationally infeasible for any malicious adversary to forge a valid DVS with respect to U 1 without knowing the signer's private key.
2) Non-transferability:
In a DVS scheme, only the designated verifier can be convinced that a signature is created by the claimed signer. The designated verifier can not convince any third party that a signature is issued by the claimed signer, since he can also forge a valid signature which is computationally indistinguishable from the one generated by the original signer.
3) Source Hiding:
It is also referred to as the signer's anonymity. That is, given a message and its corresponding DVS, it is computationally infeasible to determine the identifier of real signer from the original signer or the designated verifier.
Consider the application of three-party communication environment. One party may has to generate a signature such that only each of the other two is able to independently verify the signature.
Obviously, traditional DVS schemes of single-verifier setting are not well-suited here for that the total computational complexities double. In this paper, we propose a bilinear pairings based novel DVS scheme for three-party communication environment. The proposed scheme not only fulfills the above security requirements, but also allows each of the two designated verifiers to solely verify the signature. As to the required pairing computation, the signer and each designated verifier only have to perform once for generating and verifying the signature, respectively.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. We demonstrate the proposed DVS scheme in Section 2. Some security analyses and the performance evaluation will be discussed in Section 3. Finally, a conclusion is given in Section 4.
II. THE PROPOSED DVS SCHEME
In this section, we first briefly review some related definitions and then introduce the proposed DVS scheme.
A. Related Definitions
Let G 1 and G 2 denote two groups of the same prime order q. We say that e: G 1 × G 1 → G 2 is a bilinear map if it satisfies the following properties:
1) Bilinearity:
e(P 1 + P 2 , Q) = e(P 1 , Q)e(P 2 , Q); e(P, Q 1 + Q 2 ) = e(P, Q 1 )e(P, Q 2 ); e(P a , Q b ) = e(P, Q) ab for P, Q∈G 1 and a, b∈
2) Non-degeneracy:
If g is a generator of G 1 , then e(g, g) is a generator of G 2 .
3) Computability:
Given P, Q∈G 1 , the value of e(P, Q) can be efficiently computed by a polynomial-time algorithm.
Definition 1 (Bilinear Diffie-Hellman (BDH) problem)
Given a BDH instance (g, A, B, C)∈G 1 where
Definition 2 (Bilinear Diffie-Hellman assumption)
For every probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm A, every positive polynomial Q(⋅) and all sufficiently large k, the algorithm A can solve the BDH problem with an advantage at most ) (
The probability is taken over the uniformly and independently g∈G 1 and (a, b, c)∈ * q Z and over the random choices of A.
B. Our Scheme
The proposed DVS scheme can be divided into two phases: the signature generation and the signature verification phases. Initially, the system determines the following public information:
two large primes such that q | (p − 1) ;
a bilinear pairing, e:
a one-way hash function, h 1 :
h 2 : a one-way hash function,
Each user U i chooses his private key x i ∈ (1) 
and (C 1 , C 3 ) as Eqs. (2) and (4). Then, U a (or U b ) can independently verify the received signature (r 0 , r 1 , r 2 ) by checking
If it holds, the signature (r 0 , r 1 , r 2 ) for the message M is valid.
III. SECURITY ANALYSES AND COMPARISONS
In this section, we first analyze the security of our proposed scheme and then evaluate its performance.
A. Security Analyses
We discuss some security considerations with respect to the proposed scheme from the perspectives of correctness, unforgeability, non-transferability and source hiding.
1) Correctness
A DVS scheme for three-party communication environment is correct if one party can generate a valid signature such that only the other two can check the validity of the signature when all involved parties follow the steps of the scheme. We prove the correctness of our proposed scheme as Theorem 1. (by Eq. (7)
(by Eq. (3)) = r 1 (mod q) (by Eq. (5)) which leads to the left-hand side of Eq. (9).
Q.E.D.
2) Unforgeability
To forge a valid DVS with respect to the designated verifiers U a and U b , an attacker may first randomly choose a message M' and (k', r 0 ', r 2 ') ∈ * q Z and then attempt to derive r 1 ' from Eq. (7). However, he has to solve the discrete logarithm problem (DLP) [2, 7] which is computationally intractable. Even if he could derive r 1 ', the forged signature (r 0 ', r 1 ', r 2 ') for M' would not pass the test of Eq. (9) without knowing the correct hash value of shared session key σ between the signer and the designated verifiers. On the other hand, any malicious designated verifier having the knowledge of the shared session key can not forge a valid DVS under the protection of DLP and one-way hash function (OWH) [1, 14] , either.
3) Non-transferability
A DVS scheme for three-party communication environment achieves the security requirement of non-transferability if both the designated verifiers can create a valid signature which is computationally indistinguishable from the one created by the signer. In other words, the designated verifiers can not convince any third party that a signature is issued by the claimed signer. In our proposed DVS scheme, each of the two designated verifiers U a and U b can first compute Therefore, the forged DVS (r 0 ', r 1 , r 2 ) will pass the test of Eq. (9).
4) Source hiding
In the proposed scheme, any third party having the knowledge of the shared session key σ can check the validity of the signature. Nevertheless, a forged DVS generated by the two designated verifiers has the identical distribution as the one issued by the original signer. Consequently, given a message M and its corresponding DVS, it is computationally infeasible for any third party to identify the actual signer from the original signer or the designated verifiers, even if he knows the shared session key.
B. Performance Evaluation
In this subsection, we compare the proposed DVS scheme with Susilo et al.'s one [15] in terms of executed pairings which are considered to be the most time-consuming operation in pairings-based systems. It is believed that reducing the number of such computation helps the practical implementation. To obtain a fair result, we assume that only one designated verifier is involved in each scheme. The detailed comparison is shown as Table 1 . From this Table, it can be seen that our proposed scheme has a better performance than Susilo et al.'s one by one pairing computation as a whole. 
IV. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we have proposed a novel DVS scheme for three-party communication environment from pairings. The proposed scheme only allows two designated verifiers to independently check the validity of the signer's signature. The proposed scheme is shown to have a better performance than Susilo et al.'s one and also fulfills the security requirement of unforgeability, non-transferability and source hiding. Even if the two designated verifiers reveal their secrets, they can not convince any third party that a signature is created by the claimed signer, because they can conspire to forge a valid signature which is computationally indistinguishable from the one generated by the original signer.
